The state of Georgia and its political happenings in the early nineteenth century were much like that of the entire country. Young and inexperienced in this new experiment of self government, those involved in state and national legislatures were in a constant attempt to establish and define the political powers allowed by their forefathers. The old parties of Federalist and Anti-federalist had dissolved into one national party. The Democratic-Republicans were that single party. However, they split on many local issues, creating rival factions who supported the same national candidates but loathed the politics of their personal opposition. The Second Bank of the United States, a protective tariff, and the question of Indian removal were all issues that threatened the Union during this time. Although questioned by many within the government, the overwhelming national support for Andrew Jackson kept the United States from a sectional war. In Georgia this support arose from Jackson’s attitude towards the Cherokee Indians. If not for Jackson’s strong support of Indian removal, Georgia would have most likely sided with South Carolina in declaring the Tariff of 1828 null and void, thus leading this confederation of states into a war with the federal government. Clarke County, Athens, Georgia, and the University of Georgia played important roles in deciding the nature of the powers of the states and assisted in preserving the Union through their roles in support of the federal government during the trying time of the nullification crisis

Before nullification reared its seductive head at the Southern states, the country was dividing along geographic and economic lines. The north, with its climate and population, was struggling to establish a manufacturing centered economy. During the same time the south was thriving on its slave driven agricultural economy. In reality the north was suffering because of the south’s international cotton trade which caused a large gap in the wealth of the two sections of the country. The federal government was what bound these two systems together, and any policy enacted by that body was seen as favoritism towards a particular region. Northern congressmen attempted to pass a moderate protective tariff on imported goods in order to encourage domestic trade. Southern leaders viewed this as unfair because the north would not be an adequate supplier of manufacturing in the short term and the burden to pay the taxes would not be on the Northerners but on the wealthy citizens in control of the south. The money taken from the Southerners would be used to reward inefficiency and to assist in the growth of an economic and political monopoly in the north.1For these reasons and others, the tariff continually failed when it was brought before the legislature.

During the summer of 1827, a convention was held in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania to decide the fate of the tariff discussion. The southern leaders decided to propose a tariff that would be so high that those in support of a tariff would see the absurdity of their own propositions. What the Southerners had not anticipated was the fact that what was hindering the moderates from voting for the tariff was their belief that the amount proposed in the earlier tariffs had been insufficient. The tariff became a reality and southerners became furious.2As evident by the name placed on the new tariff as the “tariff of abominations,” Southerners were displeased with the outcome of the convention and the new national policy that was enacted.

Strong anti-tariff sentiment was felt throughout the south, who chose to manifest their frustrations in many ways. The Georgia legislature debated and passed a resolution condemning the tariff for being deceptive, fraudulent, and oppressive. They also threatened that if actions were not taken by the federal government to alleviate the tariff then the Southern states would meet to decide the appropriate course of action to take. Governor John Forsyth sought to take actions to repeal the new law instead of a more harsh action. However, a particular form of anti-tariff sentiment was brewing across the Savannah River within the minds of the leaders of South Carolina. Long a figure of national prominence, John C. Calhoun reintroduced a deadly concept to those leaders already rabid with anger towards the tariff. Calhoun, the vice-president of the United States found the basis for his argument from one of its founding fathers. Drawing from the writings of Thomas Jefferson concerning the alien and sedition acts, Calhoun was able to suggest the concept of nullification as a means of resolving the tariff. He defined nullification as the belief that the Constitution was written as a contract between the states and if a state viewed an act of the Federal government as unjust that the state had the right to declare that particular act null and void within its borders. Calhoun published the South Carolina Exposition and Protest anonymously, but soon became the figure most associated with it’s dangerous beliefs in the minds of a watchful nation. The Exposition and Protest pamphlet found its way across the state lines into Georgia and soon became a debating point for the Democratic-Republican factions already at odds over personal issues.

The two factions in Georgia politics were the Clark and the Troup parties. Named after George M. Troup and General John Clark, the two were indistinguishable from each other to those outside the political arena. The state’s citizens knew little about the political differences between the two parties, but they knew enough to realize that the two parties had little tolerance for one another. The commentary of a Northern newspaper in concern to these factions admitted that “we know not what they differ about, but they do violently differ.”3Anti-tariff sentiment and the actions it justified proved to be the issue that would turn these rival factions into formally organized rival political parties.4The Troupites were composed of the older aristocratic leaders, while the Clarkites found their support from the common farmers and frontiersmen of Georgia. The state found itself in a time of change as Troupites and Clarkites constantly struggled for the office of governor. At the time that the issue of nullification arose, the Troupites had been in control of the state government since Troup actually beat Clark in the gubernatorial election of 1825. The Troupites were know for being ardent supporters of state’s rights. They were critical of any action taken to limit the powers of the state and viewed the tariff as such an action. George Troup’s protégé, John Berrien, was a leader in the party along with Judge Augustin Clayton of the Clarke County district. The Clarkites were led by men such as former presidential candidate and national political figure William Crawford. They were known for the value they held for the Union as well as their accusations that the Troupites were holding Georgia in bondage. In August of 1828, the two factions appeared to put aside their differences when a meeting in the chapel of the University of Georgia was attended by leaders of both factions. William Crawford was the chairman of the meeting while varied leaders such as Senator Berrien, Judge Clayton and Wilson Lumpkin were all present. Among the topics discussed was the suggestion of placing an excise tax on all goods coming into the state, thus forcing citizens to buy locally produced goods. This was seen as too strong an action that was too similar to the course taken by the national government. By the meeting’s end a protest of the tariff had passed as well as a recommendation to encourage the establishment of manufacturing certain necessities within the state borders.

The students at the University of Georgia found themselves at the center of the anti-tariff movement and chose to react in accordance with the wishes of the Athens meeting. The students proposed to wage economic warfare on their northern brethren by taking certain actions to encourage Georgia’s fledgling manufacturing and industrial endeavors.5By wearing garments and consuming food and drink produced within the state, they were ensuring that their money benefited the state’s economy as well as helped to establish Georgia’s economic autonomy.6University students vowed to wear “Georgia Homespun” as they tried to assist the state. Wearing this locally produced fabric was seen as a protest that might lead to recognition and eventually a harsher state policy concerning the tariff. Manufacturing pushed forward in Georgia as the first cotton mill to begin operation within the state opened in Athens in 1829. Cotton and woolen factories saw a rise in importance as the citizens relied on them for their clothing, yet public opinion was still skeptical on the matter.7A fear of failure in these endeavors called for further discussion of appropriate actions. By the time the next anti-tariff meeting was held in Athens, differing opinions had developed within the state’s leaders.

The next important meeting was called by the Clarkites in August of 1832 and was to be held, once again, in the chapel of the University of Georgia. This meeting was advertised as a gathering of those leaders who were for Jackson and against South Carolina and nullification.8In response to their own fear of a meeting of their rivals, the Troupites called for a meeting at the same location at the same time. Arriving shortly after the Clarkites had managed to begin their business by electing William Crawford as their chairman, the Troupites brought a large crowd of supporters with them. Led by Berrien and Clayton, the Troupites outnumbered the Clarkites and the meeting soon took a decidedly different tone. The Southern Recorder described the meeting as “respectable as much in the intelligence and weight of character of those who composed it.” With complete control of the meeting, the Troupites began to discuss a “great matter which all felt a deep and common concern.” This matter was the constitutionality of the protective tariff. Although professed by few, nullification was dismissed as an unconstitutional act as well as a recognition of support for Calhoun who was vocally against the President. It was necessary, however, to free Georgians from the “withering operation of the protective tariff.” The mode of effecting this was, however, greatly debated. The decision was eventually made to hold a convention in the state capital of Milledgeville to which all counties would participate in a discussion and vote on the final course of action to the appease the anti-tariff sentiment of the state. After retreating to their own counties the delegates would “come to the convention fresh from the people, familiar with their views, and armed with their authority.“9 This meeting became a topic of discussion on the national level because its appearance as the first step towards Georgia’s own adoption of nullification.10

Dinners held in South Carolina and Georgia also served to fuel the national fear that an alliance between the two states would be made. Soon after the tariff was passed, the Southern congressmen who cast votes against it were celebrated as heroes. Their honor served as reason for those in support of nullification to meet and socialize as rational support for this dangerous doctrine grew. One such dinner was held in Hamburg, South Carolina in honor of Governor Hamilton. Certain Georgia leaders were present at this dinner which proceeded to become a rally in favor of nullification. This progression was to be expected from those in attendance. Later in the same season, South Carolinian nullifiers attended dinners held in Augusta, Georgia and in Athens in honor of Augustin S. Clayton for his “able, faithful and untiring services in opposition to the ‘American System’ and the ‘Bank monopoly.‘”11Clayton had voted against the tariff in 1828 and was the only Georgia leader who openly supported nullification. This dinner was similar to the other dinners held. The directing of flattery toward Clayton soon became directing speeches in support of nullification towards all those in attendance. Georgians feared this association with South Carolina because of the inevitable outcomes of actual nullification. Any disharmony of this magnitude in the Union would lead to the taking up of arms and civil war.12The fear of bloodshed weighed heavily in the choosing of delegates to the Milledgeville convention.

The Milledgeville convention began on November 12, 1832 and quickly became the heated debate it was expected to be. Several circumstances surrounding the convention made it an even more controversial issue. Chancellor Harper and David Johnson of South Carolina’s political leadership were present. Also, the convention was given permission to meet in the chamber of the Georgia General Assembly, serving to suggest that this convention had the legal authority of the state government. The convention began with a proposal from Senator Forsyth. This proposal called for an investigation into the credentials of the delegates in attendance in order to determine if the opinions expressed in Milledgeville were those of the actual citizens. Forsyth also proposed that any correspondence between those at the convention and the leaders of any other states be released for review by the convention. Forsyth was attempting to bring the question of nullification to the forefront of the minds of the delegates in order for them to see the ultimate end to the steps the were hastily taking. This also served as an appeal to the delegates who held moderate opinions on the course of action suggesting that those who would try to sway them were actually being swayed by the leaders of South Carolina. The proposition was defeated and quickly followed by the quiet exit of Forsyth and the Clarkites. With the absence of the Clarkites it soon became evident that the Troupites were dividing. Clayton and a small group of Troupites supported the most extreme nullification and alliance with South Carolina. Others viewed the Union as too valuable an institution to be threatened by a mere economic inconvenience. The only consensus reached by the end of the convention was to suggest a Southern convention in order to gain support from other states on the appropriate action to take. The resolutions of the assembly were to be circulated throughout the state and ratified in county conventions.

The Milledgeville convention received criticism from many sources. Those who had left the convention condemned the gathering for not accurately representing the views of the whole state. The population of Georgia was 444,164 at the time of the convention, yet the Clarkites calculated that only 305,552 citizens were represented.13A majority from this body was not necessarily a majority of the state. They argued that the counties who did not send delegates to the convention were refusing to recognize the authority of the convention and could be counted as votes in opposition to any course of action recommended by the convention. The Georgia General Assembly passed a resolution in response to the proposals asserted by the Milledgeville convention. The resolution recognized that the convention’s proposals would most likely fail to be accepted by the county conventions and the ensuing discussion would disrupt any harmony the state experienced. The state legislature also questioned the validity of the convention in respect to accuracy in representing the citizens of the state. They accused those in attendance of representing a numerical minority within the state. The General Assembly did decide to let those in the state vote for or against a Southern convention, but one proposed by the “unquestionable representatives of the people.”14National criticism for the convention and the discussion of nullification within Georgia circulated in the rhetoric of national newspapers, while Southern newspapers asserted that defenses of the south’s grievances received no attention in the same newspapers.15 Northern papers condemned and mocked Georgia for being fearful of the idea of nullification when they had been practicing it for many years in response to the Federal government’s actions towards the presence of the Cherokee Indians within Georgia’s borders. They suggested that the issue was more of an argument in diction. The state needed the support of Jackson in order to remove the Cherokee. If the state embraced nullification it would be embracing Calhoun and turning its back on Jackson.16These were all considerations of one of the many concerns of the legitimate state government of Georgia. However, the common citizen was les concerned with nullification than with the acquisition of land.

The greatest concern confronting Georgians was the question of the state’s Indian policy. One Georgia newspaper offered a commentary on discussion of nullification in common conversation, observing that “the subject is seldom mentioned. The public attention is so much engrossed with the Indian question.”17Georgia was becoming a topic of national concern because of its refusal to pardon two missionaries imprisoned for violating Georgia law requiring all whites living within the Cherokee territory to give their formal allegiance to Georgia. The state viewed the Cherokee territory as a county within the state while others viewed it as sovereign and free from Georgia law. The Supreme Court was to address this case of Worcester v. Georgia in February of 1833. This would be another decisive decision that would revolutionize the federal government’s policy toward the Native Americans. The Supreme Court had addressed a previous question of who had jurisdiction over the Cherokee lands contained within the borders of Georgia. John Marshall had decided that the Cherokee held the right to the land until they saw fit to cede them to the United States. Georgia decided to react to the Supreme Court’s decision by simply not recognizing it.18This action was comparable to nullification in the minds of Georgia’s criticizers, yet was justified in minds of Georgians because the Supreme Court was not an elected body similar to Congress and was not to be given the same authority as the legislative bodies that passed the tariff, as well as the elected executive leader, Andrew Jackson.19

Jackson had been well known in Georgia for supporting the state in all matters concerning the Cherokee. He believed Georgia’s acts to be constitutional. However, he found nullification to be unconstitutional. Jackson was infuriated with Calhoun’s South Carolina and was trying gain the congressional support necessary for raising troops against the state. When the congressional approval to use force to influence South Carolina was refused on the grounds that the force had to be used against Georgia as well, Jackson was faced with a test to his consistency. He had penned the Nullification Proclamation in December of 1832 in response to South Carolina’s efforts. In this document he had asserted that the Constitution created a government and not a league of independent states. This government was binding and any step towards recognizing authority over that government was an unconstitutional act.20The Supreme Court was a part of the federal government established by the constitution, so Georgia’s attempts to assert its own decisions over those of the Supreme Court were also unconstitutional. Jackson sought to avoid direct involvement with the pending Supreme Court case concerning Georgia, so he approved of various attempts to convince Georgia’s governor to pardon the missionaries before the Supreme Court was allowed to rule in favor of the missionaries. This action would show Georgia’s submission to the federal government and the calming of the anti-tariff movement in the south. South Carolina would find itself alone in the destructive actions against the tariff. This would cause the movement to fall there as well. South Carolina’s fate was contingent to the fate of Georgia.

In 1832 Wilson Lumpkin was the governor of Georgia and, although vehemently against the dangerous doctrine, he decided to use the threat of nullification to Georgia’s political advantage. By not joining in South Carolina’s nullification doctrine, Georgia was never a direct threat to the federal government. However, they had not yet officially recognized the approval of Henry Clay’s tariff compromise and were still opposed to any protective tariff. Who Georgia would ally themselves with would decide the fate of the tariff and the Union. Their support for the federal government came from the support Andrew Jackson showed with concern to Georgia’s attitude towards the Cherokee. The economic inconvenience of the tariff was viewed as insufficient reason to destroy the Union which was so beneficial to every aspect of the life of the state.21 In the end the acquisition of gold-rich Cherokee land was justification for supporting the federal government and ending any discussion of further anti-tariff action.

Georgia decided the fate of the nation during the trying times of the nullification crisis. If Jackson had chosen to declare Georgia’s authority over the Cherokee as unconstitutional, South Carolina and Georgia would have found grounds for a new union that would have led to a civil war. Had Georgia decided there was no need for federal support for their Indian policies, there would have been a civil war. Had force been used against South Carolina, Georgia would have helped in her defense out of fear for her own safety and war would have ensued. The reason that none of these alternatives to the actual course of history took place is because of the support the state of Georgia gave Andrew Jackson’s policy towards the Cherokee within the state. The Cherokee kept Georgia from a destructive course of action during complex political turmoil that had the potential to end in the weakening or destruction of the United States. In one of the peculiar ironies of history, the Cherokee Indians were the most important element in saving the nation that would eventually take their homes and kill their children.

1. Michael John Gagnon, “Transition to an Industrial South, Athens, Georgia, 1830-1870.” (Ph.D. diss., Emory University, 1999), 23-26.

2. David Franklin Houston, A Critical Study of Nullification in South Carolina. New York: Russell & Russell, 1967, 33-34.

3. Hezekiah Niles, Niles Register, Vol. 41, 150, quoted in Ellis Merton Coulter, “The Nullification Movement in Georgia.” Georgia Historical Quarterly 5 (1921): 5.

4. Ellis Merton Coulter, “The Nullification Movement in Georgia.” Georgia Historical Quarterly 5 (1921): 39.

5. Gagnon, 36.

6. Gagnon, 32.

7. Coulter, 8.

8. Richard E. Ellis, The Union at Risk: Jacksonian Democracy, States’ Rights and the Nullification Crisis. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 106.

9. Southern Recorder (Milledgeville), 24 August, 1832.

10. Coulter, 15.

11. Southern Recorder (Milledgeville), 13 September, 1832.

12. Ronald Watson Faircloth, “The Impact of Andrew Jackson in Georgia Politics, 1828-1840.” (Ph.D. diss., University of Georgia, 1971), 62.

13. Coulter, 27.

14. Georgia General Assembly, Acts of the General Assembly of the State of Georgia, Passed in Milledgeville at an Annual Session in November and December, 1832. 1832, 254.

15. “The Crisis,“ Southern Recorder, 4 October, 1832.

16. Niles, 6.

17. “Mr. Woods’ Resolutions,” Athenian. 7 December, 1830.

18. George Brown Tindall and David Emory Shi, America: A Narrative History, Brief Fifth Edition (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2000), 345.

19. Ellis, 115.

20. Andrew Jackson, Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789-1897, 1832 (Washington, D.C.:GPO, 1900).

21. Faircloth, 60.