Charles J. Mullins

History 4070

The War of 1812, or the Late War as it is sometimes referred, does not receive nearly the same amount of attention in American history as the Revolutionary War; many historians view it as the result of long-standing disputes that remained unresolved dating back to the American Revolution. This poor attentiveness towards the War of 1812 may be due to its lack of a decisive winner or loser. Many historians think of the outcome of the conflict as a draw. However, one group did lose – Native Americans.

There are multiple explanations as to why the U.S. declared war on Great Britain. The Madison Administration’s primary argument for war was based on the Royal Navy’s refusal to permit U.S ships to sail to Europe, its search of those same vessels, and its seizure as well as forced enlistment of Americans into its ranks. Also considered as a principal cause for the conflict was the supply of arms to Indians by the British. Both of these reasons were pretexts. The most likely and important cause of the War of 1812 was land – British land (Canada) and Indian land – especially Indian land. “The United States fought five of the seven major land battles of the War of 1812 primarily against Native Americans.” Of those battles, the earliest may have been the most significant – the Battle for Detroit.1

The Battle for Detroit was actually a series of lesser-known skirmishes on both sides of the Detroit River. It began with the invasion of Upper Canada by U.S. forces commanded by Brigadier-General William Hull, and ended with the capture of Fort Detroit by Shawnee Chief Tecumseh and his warriors and their ally, the British, led by Major-General Isaac Brock. The war Tecumseh waged, on behalf of Great Britain and the Indian peoples, across the Detroit was vital to the defense of Upper Canada from American belligerence, and produced the humiliating surrender of Brigadier-General Hull’s forces, as well as the entire Michigan Territory.

Prior to the start of hostilities, Tecumseh had been in the south for two years trying to convince the southern Indians, such as the Muscogees or Creeks, to join his confederacy of Indian tribes. The ultimate goal of his confederacy was to push the white settlers out of Indian lands. Tecumseh was partially successful. He managed to find support amongst a faction of the Creek Indians called the Red Sticks, but couldn’t secure the support of any of the other southern tribes. Many northern tribes supported his efforts and would be key in the coming fight against the U.S. military.

Aside from the overall poor southern response to his movement, there were setbacks at home. During Tecumseh’s absence, General William Henry Harrison attacked the chief’s base on the Wabash. With Tecumseh gone, his brother, Tenskwatawa, was in charge. Tenskwatawa proved to be not as effective a leader as his brother and the result was the destruction of the village and its provisions. Prophetstown, as white settlers had called the village, was in ruin, as well as the reputation of Tenskwatawa. Harrison’s victory at Prophetstown became known as the Battle of Tippecanoe. The attack on Prophetstown stimulated an eruption of Indian attacks and raids early in 1812. “Throughout the American settlements fear and fury followed the Indian raids.” These acts of aggression on settlers damaged Tecumseh’s efforts to solidify his confederacy and it angered him. “Tecumseh expressed disgust at the rash action of the Indians … but now he himself seemed ready for war.”2

In the spring of 1812, Tecumseh sent word to Fort Malden that he would be returning. Fort Malden was a British fort on the Canadian side of the Detroit River and it was “here the Indians came to receive supplies, meet in public council, and talk in confidence of their great father.” In June of 1812, Tecumseh began his trek through the frontier heading towards Fort Malden to seek aid from the British. “Tecumseh and the remains of his abortive confederacy sought help from the British … and soon became a part of the defence [sic] of Upper Canada.”3

Also in June, the War Hawks were circling high above Washington D.C. President Madison was considering a declaration of war on Great Britain. The case for war began as early as 1810. Voices like that of Henry Clay’s helped forge the President’s decision. “The conquest of Canada is in your power, “ [Clay] boasted. “The militia of Kentucky are alone competent to place Montreal and Upper Canada at your feet.” This was far from being true. The United States was not a military nation. “A peace of nearly thirty years, during which the Americans attended but little to improvements in the arts of war … rendered them apparently a very unequal match for [Great Britain].” Regardless of the nation’s readiness for war, Clay and the other War Hawks, a faction of the Republican Party, were successful in obtaining their goal. On June 18, 1812, President Madison announced, “that war be, and the same is hereby declared to exist between the United Kingdom of Great Britain … and the United States of America …”4

Shortly after the declaration of war, Governor William Hull of the Michigan Territory was given command of a large military force. Hull was made Brigadier-General commanding the Northwest Army of the United States. Brigadier-General Hull was a distinguished veteran of the Revolutionary War. President Thomas Jefferson had appointed Hull as Governor of the Michigan Territory in 1805. A few months before receiving the commission of Brigadier-General, Hull had tried, with little success, to convince President Madison that a second war with Great Britain would be unwise. He felt that Michigan would be vulnerable to attack from the Royal Navy and Indian. It is apparent that Hull was extremely concerned with the involvement of Indians from the start of his command. Brigadier-General Hull “wanted to make sure the Indians stayed neutral in the coming war between the redcoats and the Americans.” Hull and his troops headed north to reinforce Detroit from Ohio. They would arrive in Detroit on July 6th. From there “General Hull was to invade Upper Canada, attack Fort Amherstburgh or Malden … and proceed eastward.”5

While Hull and his men moved steadily toward Detroit, Tecumseh quickened his pace to Fort Malden. Tecumseh knew that war was about to begin. “About the beginning of July, the celebrated and magnanimous Chief Tecumseh arrived at Amherstburgh [sic]” and learned of the declaration of war. He was eager to ally with the British. Tecumseh and his men were prepared to fight. “The only group of Americans who truly thirsted for war, apart from the handful of congressmen known as the War Hawks, were Tecumseh’s followers.” Tecumseh anticipated Hull’s arrival.6

Upper Canada was extremely vulnerable to attack. Major-General Isaac Brock, who commanded in Upper Canada “knew Britain was most vulnerable in Canada.” Brock didn’t have the manpower to defend against an invasion on his western frontier. He could scarcely afford to reinforce Fort Malden and Amherstburg when he was assured of an attack from the east at Niagara. Brock knew that “Upper Canada was to have need of the Indians in the first months of the war” if it were to have any chance at all. Brock was fortunate to have Tecumseh fighting on his side.7

The event that both Tecumseh and Brock knew would occur came on July 12, 1812. Brigadier-General Hull and his army crossed the Detroit River, landed, and occupied the small town of Sandwich. They met no opposition at Sandwich. The British troops stationed at Sandwich retreated and fell back to Fort Malden. “On the enemies landing … our advance posts were withdrawn to the river Canard, within three miles of Amherstburgh [sic], “ recalled William H. Merritt of the Canadian Militia. Brigadier-General Hull established his headquarters at Sandwich and was poised to press on towards Malden to the south. With the size and strength of his troops, Hull had it within his power to “sweep away Fort Malden, and advance eastward to threaten Brock’s rear.” 8

On the following day, Brigadier-General Hull made a harsh proclamation to the residents of Sandwich. Hull’s proclamation gave further insight into his fears about engaging Indians in combat:

If the barbarous and savage policy of Great Britain be pursued, and the savages are let loose to murder our citizens, and butcher our women and children, this war will be a war of extermination.

He also made it extremely clear that there would be dire consequences for those who took up arms alongside the Indians. He said that if any white man was found fighting with the Indians, he would not be taken prisoner and no quarter would be given.9

Hull’s bravado did not diminish Tecumseh’s desire for battle. Three days after Hull’s proclamation, Tecumseh’s men would engage the Americans at the Aux Canard just above Fort Malden. Colonel Lewis Cass led a group of men to the river where they met little resistance from British troops. Cass and his men easily defeated the small detachment of redcoats and crossed the river. There they received fire from Tecumseh’s men and a few militiamen. There were not enough of them to repel Cass. Cass’s easy victory reduced the confidence of the allies. But luckily for the allies, Cass relinquished his position and marched his troops back to Sandwich. Cass’s withdrawal perplexed Tecumseh. He could not understand Hull’s reluctance to advance.

The following day, July 17th, devastating news was delivered to Brigadier-General Hull. Fort Michilimackinac had fallen into the possession of the British. Doubts began to grow in Hull’s mind. “The fall of Michilimackinac unnerved Hull,” but gave confidence enough for the other tribes of the Old Northwest to join with Tecumseh and the British. Furthermore, it proved that the Americans could be beaten. 10

More skirmishes were played out at the Aux Canard. Hull’s men were not able to press beyond this boundary. First, Tecumseh and his companion’s were able to discourage an advance made by Colonel Duncan McArthur and his detachment of men. And then on July 25, Major James Denny tried his hand at penetrating Tecumseh’s defenses. He walked right into Tecumseh’s ambush and suffered the first American casualties of the War of 1812. These skirmishes boosted Tecumseh’s confidence enough to take the fight to the Americans across the Detroit River. 11

The continued setbacks at the Aux Canard made Hull lose confidence in his troops, and he decided to pull them back to Fort Detroit. Hull began to worry about his supply and communication lines coming in from Ohio.

Hull had every right to worry about the supply and communication lines. Tecumseh was planning to disrupt them. In order for Tecumseh to do so, he would need the support of the Wyandots. The Wyandot towns of Maguaga and Brownstown guarded Hull’s communications south of Detroit. Tecumseh was able to convince the Wyandots to defect from their support of the American forces. The Wyandots were evacuated to the British side of the Detroit, and Tecumseh, along with Captain Muir, patiently waited with a substantial force of Indians and redcoats. Major Thomas Van Horne and about two hundred militiamen were escorting the mail south in an effort to meet up with a convoy at the River Raisin. He was charged with keeping the lines of communication open for Hull. Tecumseh and Capt Muir successfully ambushed Van Horne’s detachment sending them into a panic and they “rushed off in such a haste that they abandoned the mailbags.” This was a tremendous success for Tecumseh. Not only was he able to upset the flow of supplies, but also he managed to confiscate a letter Hull had sent to William Eustis, the U.S. Secretary of War. The letter showed Hull’s fear of being cut-off from his supplies. Tecumseh knew he had delivered a serious blow to Hull’s ambitions and “had tactically isolated the American army.”12

Hull was forced to take on a defensive position at Detroit. He gave up his pursuits in Canada. The invasion had ceased. Hull was too worried about regaining control of his supply line. In a letter to Eustis, Hull wrote, “I found myself compelled to suspend the operations against Amherstburg, and concentrate the main force of the army at Detroit.” 13

Tecumseh was not about to let Hull have his communication lines back. Hull was desperate to regain control and sent Lieutenant-Colonel James Miller with six hundred men to do so. Tecumseh and Capt. Muir knew he was coming and waited for Miller. With Miller in sight, Tecumseh patiently waited for the right moment and “gave the signal and there was immediate chaos as the Battle of Maguaga broke out.” Miller’s men fought hard and held firm. William Stanley Hatch, a volunteer in the Cincinnati Light Infantry, was present at the battle and noted the size of Tecumseh’s force: “We here met a very great increase of Indian force which had recently joined the standard of Tecumseh.” Tecumseh and Capt. Muir’s men offered up heavy resistance, but could not hold Miller’s men. “Indians under Tecumseh’s command held out obstinately, but they were nevertheless driven from their position.” Miller managed to drive Tecumseh’s forces out into the forest. Muir took his men back across the river to Fort Malden. Tecumseh and Capt. Muir were both wounded in the battle. A letter James Miller wrote confirms this: “We wounded the famous Tecumich [sic] in the neck, but not sufficiently to kill him.” Miller himself was “seriously injured when thrown from his horse during the confused fighting.” The Battle of Maguaga was a victory for the Americans, but Hull recalled Miller and his men back to the fort.14

On August 13, 1812 Major-General Isaac Brock arrived at Fort Malden and he brought with him much needed reinforcements. Brock had not been aware of Hull’s withdrawal back to Detroit until he arrived. With this knowledge, Brock decided to attack Detroit. He asked to meet with Tecumseh “and the principal chiefs to propose offensive plans against Detroit.” Brock’s plan was well received by Tecumseh. He too had desired this. Instantly, the two leaders developed a great respect for one another. They both agreed to proceed with the plan and Tecumseh prepared for battle.15

On the fifteenth of August, Major-General Brock sent Hull a summons to surrender. Brock played on Hull’s fear of combat with the Indians by warning that he would be unable to restrain his Indian allies if and when action commenced. Hull rejected Brock’s summons. Brock released the Indians that night. “Tecumseh and seven hundred of his warriors … silently crossed the river in a swarm of canoes.” They landed near the River Rouge at Spring Wells about three miles south of Detroit. From there, Tecumseh led his men into the forests and advanced north towards Detroit. Brock and his men landed at daylight. Brock would march his troops directly at Fort Detroit hoping to lure Hull out from its defenses.16

On the morning of August 16, 1812, Major-General Brock led his men up the road leading to Detroit. Tecumseh and his men moved through the trees threatening to surround the fort. With the knowledge that Brock and Tecumseh were on their way, Hull had sent for the return of Colonels Cass and McArthur to help defend the fort. They had been attempting to reestablish a line of supply to the fort. Cass and McArthur didn’t make it back to the fort in time.

Hull was receiving reports of Indians on the outskirts of the town. There were Indians in the trees. And it even appeared that there were Indians marching up the road with Brock. Hull was subdued by his fears of the Indians. The menace of the Indians was overwhelming. Hull hoisted the white flag and surrendered. Hull was satisfied that he had saved the inhabitants of the town and the fort from certain massacre. Fort Detroit and the entire territory of Michigan were handed over to Major-General Brock. By noon, “Brock and Tecumseh rode side by side through the streets of Detroit to formally accept the capitulation.” The American colors were lowered and the Union Jack was hoisted. William Stanley Hatch described how he felt at this sight, “when to our utter astonishment and indignation we beheld the BRITISH FLAG floating from the flag staff at the fort.”17

Tecumseh and his warriors fought hard against the superior forces of Brigadier-General William Hull. Their successes against the U.S. army encouraged other Indian tribes to join with him against the Americans. “Many of the Indians who had been pro-American now became neutral of switched their allegiance entirely to the British.” Not only did Tecumseh’s victory give hope to the Indians, it also gave much needed support and supplies to the British. Tecumseh and his Indian allies were instrumental in stopping the invasion of Canada. Without the leadership of the Shawnee Chief Tecumseh none of it would’ve been possible.18

I grew up in Detroit. Many of the names that I encountered during my readings and research were the same ones I had grown up hearing. As a youth, I had sometimes wondered where such names as Hull Road, Cass Ave. and the city of Tecumseh had come from. Places like Rouge River, Ecorse Blvd., Mackinac Island came to life once again for me. It has been many years since I have been home, and writing this paper brought me back there only for a little while. I learned a lot from this paper, and I appreciate my heritage even more.

1. James W. Dowen, Lies My Teacher Told Me: Everything Your American History Text Book Got Wrong (New York: Simon & Shuster, 1995), 123-124.

2. John Sudgen, Tecumseh: A Life (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1997), 260; and Reginald Horsman, “British Indian Policy in the Northwest, 1807-1812,” Mississippi Valley Historical Review 45, no. 1 (May 1958): 51-66.

3. Horsman, “British Indian Policy in the Northwest, 1807-1812," 55; and J. Mackay Hitsman, The Incredible War of 1812 (University of Toronto Press, 1965), 61.

4. Harry L. Watson, Andrew Jackson vs. Henry Clay: Democracy and Development in Antebellum America (New York: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 1998), 50; and Paris M. Davis, An Authentick History of the Late War Between the United States and Great Britain (Ithaca: Davis & Saunders, 1829), 20-21.

5. Sudgen, Tecumseh: A Life, 274; and The Times (London), 26 October 1812, [database online]; available from Palmer’s Full Text Online, accessed 19 March, 2004.

6. William H. Merritt, Journal of Events Principally on the Detroit and Niagara Frontiers During the War of 1812 (Athens, GA.: University Microfilms, 1863), 8-13; and Pierre Berton, The Invasion of Canada (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1980), 27.

7. John Sudgen, Tecumseh’s Last Stand (University of Oklahoma Press, 1985), 21-24.

8. William H. Merritt, 9; and John Sudgen, Tecumseh a Life, 282.

9. Paris M. Davis, 30-31.

10. John Sudgen, Tecumseh: A Life, 287.

11. John Sudgen, Tecumseh: A Life, 288.

12. Sandy Antal, A Wampum Denied (Carleton University Press, 1997), 78; and Harrison Bird, War for the West 1790-1813 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), 125.

13. The Times (London), 20 October 1812, [database online], available from Palmer’s Full Text Online, accessed 19 March, 2004.

14. Alan W. Eckert, A Sorrow in Our Heart: The Life of Tecumseh (New York: Bantam Books, 1992), 597; William Stanley Hatch, A Chapter of the History of the War of 1812 in the Northwest (Athens, GA.: University Microfilms), 38; Edward Eggleston and Lillie Eggleston Seelye, Tecumseh and the Shawnee Prophet (New York: Dodd, Mead, and Company, 1878), 245; John E. Lewis, ed., The Mammoth Book of War Diaries and Letters: Life on the Battlefield in the Words of the Ordinary Soldier, 1775-1991 (New York: Carroll and Graf Publishers, Inc., 1999), 58; and Sandy Antal, A Wampum Denied, 82.

15. Sandy Antal, A Wampum Denied, 93.

16. Alan W. Eckert, A Sorrow in Our Heart, 603-604.

17. Alan W. Eckert, A Sorrow in Our Heart, 605; William Stanley Hatch, 53.

18. Alan W. Eckert, A Sorrow in Our Heart, 608.