Chris Jeffords

 

March 4, 2004

 

Jefferson’s Embargo: Opinions and Reactions of His Diverse Constituency

           

            Thomas Jefferson faced a serious threat in his second term as President of The United States of America.  This threat came from across the sea from both an old enemy as well as a former ally.  Great Britain and France were each on the brink of engagement with each other and looked to the United States to aid one side, or the other.  Thomas Jefferson, however, saw the United States as a neutral nation and felt that it deserved no part in going to arms for either France or Great Britain.  Unfortunately, neither France nor Great Britain respected the right of the United States to remain neutral, so President Jefferson and his advisers had to take a political stand.  On December 22, 1807, President Jefferson signed the act imposing an embargo on all American shipping to and from foreign ports.  This last important measure of his administration was intended to be his greatest triumph.  It was to prove the superiority of peaceful means of coercion in international disputes in which the usual result was to war[1].  To what extent was Thomas Jefferson successful in accomplishing this goal?  This question posed is not pertaining to the political reaction of either Great Britain or France or the series of ensuing events, but the impact domestically on the opinions formed of Jefferson by Americans of all walks of life.  The purpose of this paper is to present varying opinions and reactions to Jefferson’s Embargo from people directly involved in the matter.  Several questions will be presented and answered including:  How did Thomas Jefferson’s own party react to the Embargo?  How did Southerners and Northerners alike react during the embargo?  What was the general consensus in the relatively small port town of Savannah, Georgia?  How did people respond whose livelihood depended on shipping?  What effects of the Embargo were felt in foreign ports?  What did correspondents from England think about the Embargo, and more importantly, how did they portray the thoughts of Americans to people in England?  As will be evidenced in the following pages there was not one overpowering outcry against the Embargo, as thought by many, but rather several varying opinions from all angles of the issue were formed and expressed.

            “A strong president may be able to lead a peaceful nation into war, but it takes a stronger one to keep an angry nation out of a war which it is already on the verge of entering.”1 This statement represents the thoughts of many Jefferson supporters when deliberating on the issue of an embargo.  The decision for Jefferson came down to two opposing view points: Should America take up arms against foreign aggressors, or impose economic sanctions?  The United States in the early Nineteenth Century had very little military muscle, so realistically a war with Great Britain, France or both was out of the question as evidenced by James Sullivan, Democratic Governor of Massachusetts:

            There is no way to carry on a war with that vigour which is necessary to success without the decisive aid of a Judiciary: our judiciary here, would, under any circumstances that can take place, be decidedly against the Government of the United States and on the part of England.  The Judiciary of the United States in this district is still more unpropitious to the Safety of the country.  We shall, if a war takes place, be instantly plunged in a civil war in this State if the Judiciary continues as it is at present, and yet I do not conceive of a remedy.[2]

 Jefferson met with his personal advisers as well as received support from John Adams.  John Adams, the only living ex-president desired to see it given a fair trial; for he could not bring himself to face the alternative of war.1  President Jefferson also received support from as far south as Savannah, Georgia, a port city that would undoubtedly feel the effects of the embargo.  “We greatly fear that every honorable effort to maintain or neutrality will prove fruitless”.[3]  The sentiment in Savannah was that there was no choice in the matter and a great sense of patriotism came with embracing the Embargo as evidenced by this contributor:

             American people to engage in no kind of exterior commerce.  Hence it is evident, that they viewed us as a people possessed of resources within ourselves adequate to produce necessary comfort.  Certain it is, we could exist comfortably, and yet have our external commerce contracted into very narrow bounds; and I feel no hesitation in declaring that I think such a procedure would essentially promote our interests, present and future.[4]

Some believed in Savannah that Americans became too heavily concerned with European luxuries as opposed to the simple goods and wares of American craftsmen.  They then encouraged their fellow Americans to be content without the fine cloths of foreign countries, and embrace the simpler goods such as cotton.4  Support such as this from his own party allowed President Jefferson to pass his Embargo almost two to one: Yeas 82, Nays 44.4  This support from Democratic-Republicans would last Jefferson throughout most of the Embargo.  Soon after its passage, a contributor in Savannah wrote, “…a demonstration to the world, that we possess a virtue and a patriotism which can take any shape that will best suit the occasion.  The Embargo violates the rights of none.  Its object is to secure ourselves.  It is a measure of precaution. Not of aggression”.[5]  The contributor further speculated that England would suffer the loss of naval stores, France would be cut off from customers of luxury items and supplies to make them, and Spain may be the country to suffer most due to the heavy reliance on food supply from the United States.5 

            After the Embargo was passed, how did the Southern economy react?  Although the press publicized the Embargo as vehicle for patriotism and a way for Americans to become self-reliant in a state of autarky, many looked at it in a more self-interested way.  Before the Embargo had been in effect two weeks, a Virginian from Charlottesville wrote to a correspondent in Richmond that, “This Embargo will ruin this state if it continues long.  They talk about locking up the courts of justice.  In 12 hours after the news of the Embargo, flour fell from 5 ½ $ to 2 ½ . at this place, and tobacco from 5/2 to 3$ and everything in proportion, and God only knows the result”.2   Reactions such as this so close to the beginning of the Embargo would only worsen as the year of 1808 wore on.  A petition from Lincoln County, North Carolina, dated December, 1808, begged Jefferson to lift the Embargo to “…permit the vessels of all nations without partiality freely to trade and Carry off our produce where they please at their own risque…”.2  Although there were many uproars such as this to the Embargo, the South as a whole felt a loyalty to Jefferson through the tradition of the “Virginia Dynasty”.2  Resorting to the sentiment of patriotism and resourcefulness among Americans, The Richmond Enquirer wrote, “Our women should all learn to spin, card , weave, dye, and manufacture, in the various modes for flax, hemp, cotton and wool.  We may not have open markets abroad for years, and our planters will want the aid of our manufactures to up the price of their produce, and to furnish supplies”.[6]  The view of some to resort to manufacturing in the South proved fruitless as nearly a century was to elapse before the South became in any sense a manufacturing country.2 

            The South, being almost completely reliant on its agricultural products, could see first hand how the Embargo impacted the economy.  The price (in cents per pound) of Sea Island Cotton in the United States before the Embargo was 41.60 compared to 22.25 during the Embargo.  The average price of farm products fell from 93.5 before down to 71.0 during.[7]  After bearing witness to these price fallouts, how did the editors of the Savannah Public Intelligencer respond?  “It cannot be doubted then, but that the consequences of a war would be much more detrimental and distressing to the United States of America, than the consequences of an embargo.  But the advantages resulting to the enemy from the prosecution of a war must be further noticed to demonstrate how mistaken and injudicious a measure the annunciation of hostilities would prove”.[8]  In response to the anonymous criticism of Jefferson, “Mr. Jefferson has so often been called a ‘coward’, on this account, by those know that the real merits of the case will not justify the epithet, that it is not to be wondered if some honest and unsuspicious individual should be influenced to believe that he is so”.[9]   The overriding sentiment of the South, at least that of the editors of a large southern newspaper, still supported Jefferson’s Embargo as well as firmly held on to the idea that avoiding war was the best possible course of action.  However, was this pattern of thought reflected in the sentiments of Northerners?

            Throughout his presidency, Thomas Jefferson repeatedly dealt with opposition from the Federalist Party, who were predominantly Northerners.  Their protests were issued to the president rather politely as evidenced in the Philadelphia Gazette, reprinted in the Savannah Public Intelligencer:

                        That in consequence of the present embargo laws the situation of your petitioners is grievous and effecting: that they have been engaged in the mercantile service since their, with few exceptions, and accustomed to only to conduct ships or vessels across the ocean, that from the operation of the present restrictive laws, they find themselves cut off from their usual employment, and of course the means of subsistence are gone.  Your petitioners are well acquainted with the duties of conducting ships from port to port; well conversed in naval tactics, but unable to handle the harrow or the plow.  Your petitioners therefore pray, that your Excellency will take their case into consideration, and will adopt such measures as will relieve the wants of your petitioners; or if there are vacancies in the navy, to give your petition to some an opportunity of serving therein.[10]

Thomas Jefferson’s reply was that which is expected of politicians.  He thanked the petitioners for their sacrifices during the circumstances and would continue to listen to petitions and consider a different course of action when it was time to do so.  Of course, political discontent is not always as direct or polite as evidenced by one Federalist wit, “Our President…..delights in the measure because the name hides so well his secret wishes.  Read it backward, and you have the phrase, “O grab me”.  Divide it into syllables and read backward, and you have the Jeffersonian injunction, “Go bar ‘em”.  Transpose the seven letters of the word, and you will have what the Embargo will soon produce, “mob-rage”.1  Sentiments such as this in the North did not only come from a party with dissenting opinions as the sitting president, they evolved from the situations people faced everyday.  Fishermen were hit first and hardest by the Embargo, for their income, never carefully husbanded, had ceased immediately.  In Massachusetts alone, 5,571 of these signed a petition asking for repeal, and some of the signers were selectmen, representing a large number of men.  By early 1809 in Salem, Massachusetts a soup house was established and about one-ninth of the town’s population was dependant on it for subsistence.1   The opinions of Americans in the United States itself were varied with strong feelings on both sides of the issue, but what was the reaction of Americans in other parts of the world?

            Thomas Appleton was serving as consul in the Italian port city of Leghorn during the Embargo.  It was his duty to manually keep track of American shipping vessels, their cargo, and time spent in port.[11]  The evidence from his records is not surprising: the number of American vessels to pass through Leghorn in 1807 totaled 146.  In 1808, the only complete calendar year of the Embargo, the number of ships dwindled to a mere 18.  Is this to suggest that the Embargo was a success?  If success is to mean the physical restriction of trade to foreign nations, yes it was a success.  But talking about success in terms of establishing ourselves as an autarky, as well as Jefferson’s political success here at home, it shows the blunder of the president’s calculations.  With 95 of the above mentioned 146 ships being New England vessels, it is no wonder the mercantile class of New England petitioned Jefferson to repeal his embargo.  After studying the opinions of Americans in response to the Embargo, one should consider the opinions of those whom the Embargo was initially meant to harm.

            The letters of John Howe, an Englishman, express not only contempt of American policy but joy in midst of its failure.  The opinions expressed by this particular gentleman are not surprising, considering he is in the same country that means to undermine his own.  In his correspondence to Great Britain, he is excited at the prospect that the Embargo will be repealed after only one year.  “I had renewed with increased satisfaction, on finding that the opposition to the measures pursued by the Government was daily gaining ground; and I was assured by very respectable Men in the sea-ports in Connecticut that whole districts had agreed to wait until the Meeting of Congress in November in expectation that the Embargo would be then removed, but if it was not then taken off, they have determined to open the Trade themselves”.[12]  As Mr. Howe traveled throughout the Northeast, he gathered that the opinions of many Americans were that of utter discontent for the current economic hardships and even ventured so far as to predict James Madison would not be elected president.  It must always be kept in mind that since Howe was English, he was at risk to put a personal spin on his correspondence letters.  It is also interesting to note that Howe supported the Federalist Party as evidenced here, “The Federal Party is composed of Men of the greatest property in the Country, and of the most respectable Talent and Characters”.12  To Howe, the issue of the Embargo has “…completely federalized all the New-England States…” and eerily predicts that it will “…eventually lead to a division of the Southern and Northern States …that such an event is by no means improbable, and indeed may openly express their wish that it may take place”.12  Howe continues his commentary of the United States by remarking that the general feelings of the population are that of discontent with the persons in power and surely a change will be made in the next elections.  This should not be misinterpreted to mean that the Federalist felt guaranteed to win the next round of elections as Howe remarked that both Democratic-Republicans and Federalist were filled with anxiety over the November elections.  Howe concludes his second letter with the assurance that the Embargo will be repealed and vessels anticipating this were already being fitted for sea to resume their trading.

            American politics over the last couple of centuries has not changed a great deal when focusing on the thought and behavior patterns of everyday constituents.  Just as in the modern political climate, Thomas Jefferson’s Embargo was witness to many sides of the issue from various factions, regions and nationalities.  Often we look at only the black and white of issues: what we know happened and what we know did not.  The purpose of this paper was to look deeper than recorded events, and understand what real people of the time thought about important public policy in the early Republic.  By focusing on Northerners, Southerners, Democratic-Republicans, Federalist as well as foreigners’ opinions and thoughts, it is possible to apply each opinion with their own varying reaction to a very important event in American history.  By analyzing history in this manner, historians are better able to paint a portrait of history with human emotion as color and facts as the sketch.  


Endnotes



                [1] Thorp Lanier Wolford, “Democratic-Republican Reaction in Massachusetts to the Embargo of 1807,” The New England Quarterly, Vol. 15, No. 1, (Mar., 1942), 35-61.

 

            [2] Louis Martin Sears, “Jefferson and the Embargo”, (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1927), 58, 228-252.

 

            [3] Savannah Public Intelligencer, (Friday, January 1, 1808). 

           

            [4] Savannah Public Intelligencer, (Friday, January 8, 1808).

           

            [5] Savannah Public Intelligencer, (Friday, January 15, 1808).

           

            [6] The Richmond Enquirer, (February 26, 1808).

           

            [7] Jeffrey A. Frankel, “The 1807-1809 Embargo Against Great Britain”, The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 42, No. 2, (Jun., 1982), 291-308.

 

            [8] Savannah Public Intelligencer, (Friday, October 7, 1808).

                 

                [9] Savannah Public Intelligencer, (Tuesday, August 23, 1808).

 

                [10] Savannah Public Intelligencer, (Friday, December 23, 1808).

 

            11 Charles A. Keene, “American Shipping and Trade, 1798-1820: The Evidence from Leghorn”, The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 38, No. 3, (Sep.,1978), 681-700.

 

            12 “Secret Reports of John Howe, 1808”, The American Historical Review, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Jan., 1912) 332-354. 

 

 

LINKS:

 

An Interesting Thomas Jefferson Page

 

The Embargo Act

 

A Letter About the Embargo